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ABSTRACT
This project examined strategies employed by the Los

Angeles Archdiocese in communicating with the media during
the initial phases of handling the child sexual abuse

scandal. Review of professional literature yielded five

generally accepted principles that should govern crisis
communication:

timeliness, openness, honesty, regret, and

accessibility.

Internal and external messages from the archdiocese
were analyzed in terms of how well they conformed to the
five principles. Overall, the conclusion was that the

archdiocese failed to meet all five criteria. In sum,

results show that, during this period,

these

the archdiocese lost

the public trust. The results are discussed, along with a

few recommendations to public relations professionals and
academicians regarding communication crises.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Project
The purpose of the project is to examine strategies
employed by the Roman Catholic Los Angeles Archdiocese in

communicating with the media during its crisis of child
sexual abuse from late January 2002 to early June 2002. The
study argues that the archdiocese's crisis communication
efforts failed because they violated five principles of

effective crisis communication: 1)
3) honesty,

timeliness,

2)

openness,

4) regret, and 5) accessibility.

Description of the Project

The project consists of five chapters:

1)

Introduction, which is an overview of the project; 2)
Background of the Study, which describes the archdiocese's

strategies in communicating the scandal as a crisis in
public relations,

the background of the archdiocese and its

child sexual abuse scandal,

the archdiocese's communication

strategies in the crisis, public opinion on the
archdiocese's crisis communication, and the five-factor

model of effective crisis communication which used to
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analyze the crisis; 3) Methodology, which describes

analytical procedures employed in the study to examine

crisis communication strategy employed by the archdiocese
in communicating with the media during the child sexual

abuse scandal; 4) Analysis, which describes how the

strategies employed by the archdiocese in communicating
with the media during the crisis violated the five
principles of effective crisis communication; and 5)

Conclusions and Recommendations.

Significance of the Project

This project is a contribution to public relations

practitioners and the academic community in the world of
crisis communication. Practitioners will benefit from
reading this project because its model of effective crisis

communication can serve as a source of guidelines for

communicating about future organizational crises with the
media and the public. The academic community will benefit
from this project because it applies this model of

effective crisis communication to a scandal of major

societal importance affecting hundreds of past and future
sexual abuse victims, as well as millions remaining
faithful to the Church's living institutions. More
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directly,

this communication crisis influenced the

perceptions and judgments of the following stakeholders:

media personnel, members of the Los Angeles Archdiocese,

members of other Catholic dioceses worldwide, regional law

enforcement and court officials, and businesses and non
governmental organizations allied with the Los Angeles

Archdiocese.

This project suggests guidelines that public relations
academicians can apply in analyzing how the model works in
assessing organizational communication crises across the

board.

Limitations of the Project

This project examined the communication strategies

employed by the Los Angeles Archdiocese during its child
sexual abuse crisis only from late January 2002 to early

June 2002. This six-month time frame is considered by the

author as the most reasonable; because,

during this period,

the archdiocese managed the crisis independently, with no

guidance from other dioceses in the country or the Vatican.
The archdiocese's child sexual abuse issue is still ongoing
even though the study ended in mid-June 2002. This study

makes no claim that what was discovered in the time
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reported here accurately characterizes the archdiocese's

current crisis communication strategies. It is worth
speculating that a possible reason why this crisis is still

ongoing rests with the failure of crisis communication
strategy examined in the study.

Crisis communication by the archdiocese is unique

because the organization is a non-profit, private,

religious institution with a special relationship with its
parishioners. That relationship is different from that of a

profit corporation with its customers. The membership with

the archdiocese is voluntary. Its major income comes from
contributions by its parishioners and donors.

However, the Catholic Church is one of the biggest

businesses going, not to mention one of the most political.
Nationally, the Church takes in $8.2 billion a year in

donations at the parish level, according to’ Joseph Harris,

a researcher who is finishing the largest study to date on
Catholic giving for the Center for Applied Research in the

Apostolate at Georgetown University. Harris also says that

the Catholic Church does tremendous amounts of good work
with much of this money in the areas of housing,

education,

and human rights. The $8.2 billion in yearly revenue places

the Catholic Church 234th on the Fortune 500 of U.S.
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corporations. That total ranks the Church ahead of R.J.

Reynolds Tobacco, Pepsi Bottling, John Hancock Financial
Services, General Mills, Kellogg, America Online, Union

Carbide, Campbell's Soup, and Quaker Oats. There are,
course, other major Catholic-run institutions,

of

such as

universities and hospitals. Notre Dame, Boston College, and
Georgetown, for example, have respective endowments of $3
billion,

$1,045 billion, and $745 million (Jackson,

2002).

Although Harris found no historical evidence that the
child abuse scandals in local parishes had affected

revenues at the diocesan level, data from another large
urban diocese shows a decline in donations. According to a
poll conducted by Boston Globe in February 2002, nearly 20

percent of Boston-area Catholics said they had been giving
less money to the Church since the scandals broke (Jackson,
2002). For an archdiocese that had just slashed its budget,

that was not good news. If parishioners and donors stop

contributing money during this period when archdioceses
keep having to pay out millions of dollars in settlements,

their future stability will be jeopardized.
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CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
The Nature of Crisis Communication
Webster (1997) defines a crisis as "an unstable or

uncertain time or state of affairs where the outcome of
which will have a major impact."

According to Williams and Treadaway (1992), a crisis
in public relations is encountered when the organization

faces a situation which is closely observed by the media,

and which interrupts normal business operations with

potential monetary and credibility damage. Crisis
communication constitutes the organization's response to
this situation in an effort to minimize damage to the

organization's image. Lerbinger (1986) notes:

A crisis is a public event, and the media inevitably
converge on the scene. Management must cope not only

with the crisis itself but also with the adjunct of

public relations. A crisis strips an organization of

its privacy and leaves it exposed to public scrutiny.
(P-

83)

The Los Angeles Archdiocese's child sexual abuse
scandal reflects Williams and Treadaway's

6

(1992) criteria

of a crisis in public relations. The scandal caused close

observation by the media,

interrupted the archdiocese's

normal business operations, and damaged the archdiocese's
financial and positive public image.,

About the Archdiocese

The Roman Catholic Los Angeles Archdiocese is the
nation's largest archdiocese and comprises three counties
in Southern California: Los Angeles, Ventura, and Santa

Barbara

(Winton & Shuster, 2002). The territory covers

8,762 square miles and extends from the northern county
line of Santa Barbara County to the southern county line of
Los Angeles with 3,595,414 faithfuls living among a total
population of 10,330,409

(Archdiocese Of Los Angeles,

2002) .

The archdiocese is responsible for 284 parishes
located in 120 cities in the three counties, nineteen

missions and chapels,

230 elementary schools serving 70 , 750

students, and 53 high schools serving 31,170 students
(Archdiocese of Los Angeles,

2002).

7

Background of Crisis

The Roman Catholic Church in the United States and
Europe has been dogged for four decades by sporadic

complaints of its priests' sexual abuse of children

entrusted to their care. Legal challenges to the Church,
once focused mainly on individual priests and dioceses,

have increasingly targeted high Church officials for

complicity in failing to protect children from sex abuse.
Above all,

this analysis shows that the Church has

lost the trust of the public. The high numbers of lawsuits

filed by victims against the Church, along with high-cost
settlements, have posed political,

financial, moral, and

image problems for the Church. The scandal has tested
Catholics'

faith in God and their Church, as distinct from

their faith in the holiness,

or even competence, of some of

the Church's leaders. The scandal has also damaged not only
the trust of Catholics but also of non-Catholics worldwide.

The scandals and lawsuits have caused the Church to go
through one of the biggest crises in its history.

The scandals gained national attention in early
January 2002, as a result of news coverage about the
Archdiocese of Boston was found to have known for years

about, but failed to act against, a priest named John
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Geoghan who had been accused of molesting 130 children over
the last twenty years

(Walker, 2 0 02) .

The archbishop of Boston then, Cardinal Bernard Law,
was urged by Boston Catholics to resign for making

decisions to continue to assign Geoghan and many other
pedophile priests to parish work with access to children,
despite his acknowledgment that these priests had
previously molested children (Paulson, 2 002) .

The Cardinal did admit and did apologize that,

in

1984, he had made the wrong decisions to keep Geoghan in

parish work, but he refused to resign because the Vatican

had not criticized him for his handling of the matter and
had not asked him to resign—as any action against him
could only be taken by the pope (Paulson, 2 0 02) . On

December 13, 2002,

the Cardinal finally resigned as

archbishop of Boston admitting that he wished he could have
stayed in his job but believed that his resignation was the
best decision for the archdiocese (Belluck,

2002) .

The Boston scandal led other dioceses in the country
to open up about sex abuse. In Pennsylvania over the past

half-century,

58 priests had faced credible accusations of

abuse—some of the alleged abusers were now dead or
retired. In Missouri,

the Diocese of St. Louis removed two
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priests who had been accused of abuse years ago,

then

released their names. The Diocese of Kansas City-St. Joseph
acknowledged that it had paid $25,000 in 1996 to settle an

abuse claim against a priest, but did not release his name.
In Maine,

the Diocese of Portland ordered two priests to

announce their histories of sexual abuse to their parishes.

The Diocese of Albany, New York, revealed it had quietly
paid hundreds of thousands of dollars to settle child
molestation cases against nine priests since 1977

(Zoll,

2002) .
There were more than 80 priests accused of sexual

misconduct with minors in Boston Archdiocese over the last
four decades

(Szaniszlo, 2002). Robertson and Kurkjian

(2002) reported that the archdiocese, already in fiscal
distress from years of spiraling costs,

faced the prospect

of paying more than $40 million to settle 140 pending

sexual molestation claims against priests and tens of

millions of dollars beyond that to settle new claims.

Description of Crisis

The scandal shifted focus from Boston to Los Angeles
in the last weekend of January 2002, when a sex abuse

lawsuit that was filed against the archbishop of Los
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Angeles, Cardinal Roger Mahony, gained media attention

(Lopez,

2002) .

Mahony was sued by a victim who said that, as the head
of the Los Angeles Archdiocese, he knew of several
instances of molestation at St. John's Seminary in the

1980s and failed to call the police or help the victims
(Lopez, 2002) . Mahony was also accused of protecting

pedophile priests by assigning them to parish work with
access to children, despite knowing of their misconduct

(Gumbel,

2 0 02) . Mahony, as it turned out, did not have to

take a stand in this case. This case was settled within
days of Mahony's summons. Mahony made no public

announcement on the case and its settlement, and he refused
to answer questions from the media and the public

(Lopez,

2002) .

About a month later,

on February 21, Mahony responded

by writing a pastoral statement entitled "I Will Appoint

Over You Shepherds After My Own Heart," which was published
in the archdiocese's newspaper The Tidings,

in the

archdiocese's Spanish newspaper Vida Nueva,

and on the

archdiocese's website www.la-archdiocese.org/english

(Winton & Stammer, 2 002; Mahony, 2 0 02) .
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In the pastoral statement, Mahony reiterated the
archdiocese's Zero Tolerance policy that he had issued in
1988 after two years of being the archbishop of Los

Angeles. The policy stated that "the Archdiocese of Los
Angeles will never deal with a problem of sexual abuse on

the part of a priest or deacon by simply moving him to
another ministerial assignment"

(Los Angeles Times Staff

and Wire Reports Metro Desk, 2002).
policy, Mahony wrote:

In complying with the

"the archdiocese will not knowingly

assign or retain a priest, deacon, religious or layperson
to serve in its parishes,

schools, pastoral ministries,

or

any other assignment when such an individual is determined
to have previously engaged in sexual abuse of a minor"

(Stammer & Lobdell, 2 0 02) . Mahony also wrote that he agreed
to continue to abide by the California Child Abuse and

Neglect Reporting Act that mandated each person worked for
the archdiocese to report any reasonable suspicion of child

abuse to local police or to child protective services
(Mahony,

2002).

Approximately a week after publishing the pastoral
statement,

on March 4, the media bombarded the archdiocese

for trying to cover-up the scandal by not revealing the
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names and numbers of alleged pedophile priests that Mahony
had recently dismissed (Stammer & Lobdell,

2002) .

Sources familiar with the dismissals told the Los
Angeles Times reporters Stammer and Lobdell

(2002)

that,

for the past two weeks Mahony had directed "six to 12" Los

Angeles Archdiocese priests who were involved in past
sexual abuse cases to retire or otherwise leave their

ministries. None of these priests were believed to be

involved in any recent cases, and all of them had received

psychological1 counseling. Of these targeted priests,

those

who were 62 or older were asked to retire; younger priests

were told that their status as priests was now inactive;

those who resided in either a parish rectory or other
church facility were asked to move out; and all of them

were also asked to consider leaving the priesthood
entirely.

The dismissals caused many critics in the Los. Angeles
community to complain about why these Los Angeles priests
being asked to leave only now,
I

since the archdiocese had

begun instituting its Zero Tolerance policy since 1988. The

critics said Mahony should have fired the pedophile priests
years ago instead of moving them from parish to parish with
access to children (Stammer & Lobdell, 2 002) .
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Mahony declined to publicly discuss the dismissals,
and other archdiocese officials were also unwilling to
comment on whether the archdiocese had reported those abuse

cases to law enforcement authorities. Mahony's spokesman
and media relations director, Tod Tamberg,

told the media

on that same day, March 4, as the'media's attack regarding

the covered up dismissals that Mahony stood by his February
21 pastoral statement agreeing to abide the California

Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. Tamberg said Mahony
was committed to obeying the law and protecting the

children of the archdiocese (Winton & Stammer, 2002).
On that same day, March 4, Los Angeles Police

Department, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department1,

as

well as sheriff's departments in Ventura and Santa Barbara

told the media that the archdiocese had not given them the

names of the dismissed priests. Los Angeles County District
Attorney Steve Cooley said that, under the penal code,
citizens had a duty to report within 36 hours any specific
incident of molestation, and failure to report such crimes

was a misdemeanor (Winton & Stammer, 2002) .
According to the archdiocese's attorney, John

McNicholas,

the archdiocese's officials had received six

child molestation complaints in the last five years,

14

including two current allegations and four involving adults
complaining of past misconduct.

"Overall, there were about

50 cases of sexual misbehavior reported to the archdiocese
in the last five years"

(Winton & Stammer, 2002) .

Four days later, on March 8, Mahony responded to media

and other critics in an informational brochure on sex abuse
entitled "Respecting the Boundaries: Keeping Ministerial
Relationships Healthy and Holy." The brochure was sent to

all parishes and schools in the Los Angeles Archdiocese,

was posted on the archdiocese's website, and was printed in

the front page of The Tidings (Watanabe, 2002).

The brochure was written in a question-and-answer
format, answering such questions as the nature of sexual

abuse,

factors that might lead to it, how to prevent it,

and how the archdiocese handled complaints against clergy.
It defined sexual abuse as a behavior that can range from

intercourse to an "inappropriate gift," such as lingerie,
or a prolonged hug when a brief one would be appropriate

(Archdiocese of Los Angeles,

2002).

The brochure stated that the archdiocese would respond
to all allegations of abuse promptly with a team of

investigators,

comply with laws requiring that alleged

abuse be brought to the attention of law enforcement
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agencies,

offer psychological and spiritual counseling to

families and victims, and seek to deal as openly as
possible with the parish community over the charges. The
brochure also provided a hotline number for reporting

suspected sexual misconduct or child abuse within the Los -

Angeles Archdiocese institutions and ministries only
(Watanabe, 2 0 02) .

However,

the brochure was not a voluntary action by

the archdiocese. The brochure and hotline were two of 11
items required by the Superior Court as results of a $5.2

million lawsuit resolved in August 2001 that involved the
Orange Diocese, Los Angeles Archdiocese and an alleged

victim who had been molested twice by a priest in 1991
(Stammer,

Pasco, & Lobdell, 2001).

A week after distributing the brochure, on March 15,

Mahony ordered all priests in the archdiocese public
ministry to attend a two-weeks workshop at St. Agatha
Church in southwest Los Angeles. The workshop reviewed the

archdiocese's sexual abuse policies, offered advice on how
to maintain a healthy relationship in the ministry,

and

instructed priests on legal reporting requirements for
suspected child abuse. Priests were also asked to sign a

statement saying they had received a copy of the sex abuse
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policies

the signed statements had

(Watanabe, 2002). Again,

been required by the August 2001 $5.2 million settlement
(Stammer, Pasco,

& Lobdell, 2001).

For many of the priests,

the workshop provided the

first time to gather and share their feelings since
allegations of widespread abuse in the Boston Archdiocese
fanned the issue of child sexual abuse by clergy into a

national firestorm. During a question-and-answer period,

priests raised several concerns,

including whether to hug a

child on a playground, keep confessions confidential, and

whether innocent priests would be duly protected with legal
representation (Watanabe, 2002).
A week later, on March 22, Mahony finally publicly
confirmed

in

The Tidings

that he had dismissed a

few

pedophile priests accused of past sexual abuse, but he did
not say precisely how many clerics were involved. Nor did
he say when the reported abuses occurred, where the priests

had served, or when the archdiocese first learned of the
allegations. He said:

"only that virtually all of the cases

cited in the media were old, having occurred as long as
decades ago"

(Winton & Stammer, 2002).

After publicly confirming the dismissals, Mahony

received a telephone call from Fresno Bishop John
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Steinbock, who told Mahony that a Fresno woman named Flora
Mae Hickman had accused Mahony molesting her in 1970 when

she was a high school student. On that same day, March 22,

Mahony reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Police
Department and said that he welcomed the Fresno Police
Department to call him anytime for a telephone interview.

Mahony said that the Fresno Police could tape-record the
interview, and also that he did not need an attorney on the
line; since he had no recollection of ever meeting Miss
Hickman. Mahony made no public announcement about the

accusation. He issued only a written statement denying the

allegation to the Los Angeles Police Department, which did
not pass along to the media (Stammer & Arax, 2 0 02) .
On March 24, Mahony was confronted by protesters,
consisting of victims and their supporters, outside a Palm

Sunday service at St. Mary Magdalen Church in Camarillo,

Ventura County. According to protesters, Mahony had ignored

the sex abuse problem for too long and had not been
forthcoming enough. They were armed with banners and
leaflets calling on the archdiocese to release the names of

the recently dismissed priests. They asked for victims to
be released from settlement agreements binding them to

confidentiality,

so that they could speak out about their
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abusers. They also asked parishioners to stop contributing

money until the archdiocese became more forthcoming with
information (Winton & Hanley, 2002).
That day, Mahony made no public statement and refused

to answer questions. But Tod Tamberg repeated his previous

statement that the archdiocese was fully cooperating with
law enforcement,

and that every member of the clergy in the

archdiocese was now complying with the California Child
Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Winton & Hanley, 2 002) .

Two days 'later, on March 26, Mahony conducted a

meeting with 300 Los Angeles Archdiocese priests at Our
Lady of Refuge Church in Long Beach and addressed the issue
of victims' confidentiality agreements. Mahony said he

would support victims of long-ago sexual abuse who wanted
to break confidentiality agreements and talk, but he would

not release the names of their abusers. He cautioned that

identifying priests involved in older cases could

traumatize their victims again, and he said that he

accepted full responsibility for "the sins in the past."
Mahony also said that the subject of marriage in the

priesthood should be open to discussion. He made it clear,

however, that he saw no correlation between the Church's
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current mandate celibacy and child abuse. Sexual abusers,
he said, were often married men (Winton & Stammer, 2 0 02) .
After resisting person-to-person contact with the

media for two full months, Stammer (2002) reported that,
Mahony finally agreed to conduct a media interview on April

2. Mahony conducted the interview to explain why he had

declined earlier to reveal to the media and the public the
names and exact number of the dismissed priests. Mahony

acknowledged that it may have appear he was protecting the
priests and not the victims, but he said that two victims
in the old cases had pleaded with him not to release the

names of the abusing priests because the records would also

show their names as well. In one case, a man had told
Mahony the disclosure that he had been sexually abused as a

boy would threaten his marriage. In another case, a man who
had been abused told Mahony he had managed to avoid
answering an employment question about any history of
abuse. If it had come out that he had been abused as a

youth, he could lose his job.

Mahony said he had no objection if victims wanted to
disclose the names of their priest offenders, but he

contended he had been convinced by the archdiocese's
attorneys that it would not be practical to name a specific
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number of dismissals because several reviews of old cases
were now in process.

Mahony made it clear that none of the dismissed

priests were currently involved in any ministries involving
children or youths. There were only two current sex abuse

cases in the archdiocese, he said. One had been reported in
2001 and involved a permanent deacon. Another,

involved the

abuse of youths in an Azusa church, and had been recently

phoned in to the archdiocese's hotline.

Mahony said most of the dismissed priests were already

retired. Some were living outside the archdiocese. But he
said he had taken action against them because they received

pensions from the Los Angeles Archdiocese and remained
canonically attached as priests to the archdiocese. Some

dismissals had been delayed until February, he said,

to

make sure the priests had a supportive environment.

Mahony also said most of the priests agreed that the
archdiocese had to dismiss them, although it was difficult
for some of the men because they had had a clean record

since their cases had been disposed of by the criminal

justice system. Mahony made it clear that the issue had
nothing to do with homosexuality, heterosexuality or with

21

celibacy. He said it was a problem of "sexual maturation"
on the part of the priest.

Mahony added that the current cases of priestly abuse
were handled openly and "there was no hesitancy" to inform

a parish when "the circumstances warranted it." The

archdiocese, he said, was fully in compliance with the
California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. He ended

the interview by stating that his top priorities were to
protect children and young people and to reach out to

victims in the best way he could.

A Couple of days later, on April 4, Calvo

(2002)

reported that some of the archdiocese's internal e-mails
had been leaked to KFI-AM 640, a radio station in Los
Angeles. The radio talk show hosts, John Kobylt and Ken

Chiampou,

then read the e-mails on the air.

The leaked e-mails, dated March 13 to April 3,

2002,

revealed dialogues between Los Angeles Archdiocese
officials and attorneys as they struggled to contain child
molestation allegations against priests--allegations such

as transferring a pedophile priest to another parish.

panic, Mahony told a fellow clergyman that,

In a

out of the

eight priests involved in past sexual abuse cases that he
had recently dismissed, the archdiocese had only reported
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five of them to the Los Angeles Police Department

(Archdiocese of Los Angeles, 2002).
In the middle of reading, Calvo

(2002) reported,

the

radio hosts were stopped by an attorney for the archdiocese
who called to say that the archdiocese had obtained a

cease-and-desist order from the Superior Court. The two
hosts pulled back. But after a Superior Court judge ruled
that the missives could be made public,

the two hosts read

the e-mails in their entirety on Friday afternoon April 5.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office

dispatched an investigator to KFI during the broadcast to

obtain copies of the e-mails, which the station also
provided to the Los Angeles Times, and then posted them on
the KFI's website.

About a week later, on April 12, Winton and Shuster
(2002) reported that, Mahony had conducted a 90-minute news
conference in the residence receiving room of the new
downtown cathedral in Los Angeles.

In the interview Mahony admitted he never should have

assigned Father Michael Wempe, one of the dismissed priests
whose case was also mentioned in the leaked e-mails,

to

Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles without

informing hospital officials that he had removed Wempe from
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his parish and ordered him to a New Mexico treatment
facility for evaluation and counseling.

•Mahony said he was told Wempe could, after the
treatment, be trusted to work as a priest if he were in a

supervised job without access to children. When he assigned
Wempe, Mahony said that he did not know Cedars-Sinai had a

pediatric unit.
Mahony added that he had recently given Wempe's name
to the Los Angeles Police Department to review past

allegations against him. He said that he took full
responsibility for the mistake of not simply telling the

hospital of Wempe's background.
In the interview, Mahony continued to refuse to give

the names of the dismissed priests--repeating his earlier

statement that he had been asked by two victims not to
divulge the priests' names. For the first time, however,
Mahony clarified the number of known sex abuse cases. He
said that seven cases allegedly occurred before 1997,

four

in the last five years, and another earlier four that were

connected to priests who had left the ministry and could
not be found. There was also a smaller group of allegedly

abusive priests who were already deceased, Mahony ‘said.
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Six days later, on April 18, Stammer (2002)

reported

that Mahony had settled for another media interview to get

the word out that he was committed to taking direct action

against sexual abuse. He invited nine television stations
and two all-news radio stations to the new cathedral's

conference center.
In the interview, Mahony stressed that he and the

archdiocese were not only deeply sorry for those who had

been victimized in the past by priests, but that he was

taking "specific and forward-looking steps" to guard

against abuses happening again. Mahony announced he was
expanding the scope and authority of a panel overseeing all
sexual abuse allegations in the Los Angeles Archdiocese in
an effort to add more credibility to the process.

Mahony said, as he looked back over the clerical sex

abuse allegations, he wished he had put two of the new
programs in place earlier: an expanded panel of mostly

laypeople to examine the accusations and claims, and an
education program to teach children how to guard against

sexual abuse and other types of violence. Mahony also said
that he planned to add spiritual programs aimed at helping

abuse victims who want to continue their involvement in the
Church separate from therapy or other forms of counseling.
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In addition, a special task force would be created by

Mahony to determine how much the archdiocese had already

paid to settle abuse claims against clergy members.

Mahony promised to expand the existing nine-member

sexual abuse advisory council to 15 members, only three of
whom would be priests. The council now consisted of seven
lay members and two priests. Among the lay members were the
parents of two children who had been molested by priests,
and also a retired judge.

Mahony said he wanted to appoint a sexual abuse victim

to the expanded panel, which would have much more authority
than in the past over deciding how to resolve complaints of

priest abuse. He said the new panel would develop and

review sexual abuse policies for the archdiocese.

Mahony also said that the education programs, which
were expected to be implemented in the 284 parishes in the

archdiocese, were aimed at teaching children ways to avoid
potentially dangerous situations,

including sexual abuse,

kidnapping, and neglect by adult. These programs, Mahony
said, were designed to help children and young people in
all kinds of situations; such as how to avoid being
kidnapped, how to avoid pornography on the Internet,

how to deal with advances by abusers.
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and

Mahony stated that there were several good existing
programs that involved both minors and their parents. He
said an archdiocesan working group was in the process of

looking at these programs and should have recommendations
to make to parishes within a few weeks. Mahony said his

offer to create spiritual programs for sexual abuse victims

may not appeal to some, but he believed it was important
for the archdiocese to make "a spiritual outreach"
regarding its sexual abuse crisis.

Mahony insisted that his archdiocese was cooperating

with law enforcement authorities and that he had Zero
Tolerance policy to prevent the maintenance of abusers in

the archdiocese ministries. He said he had turned over

names of the allegedly abusive priests to the Los Angeles
Police Department, and he said that he continued to meet
with the victims.

Mahony also mentioned about the accusation against him
by the Fresno woman. He said that the Fresno police had

concluded that there was no evidence to back up her
testimony. The woman told reporters she had had mental

problems and had been diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic.

At the end of the interview, Mahony said he regretted

how he and the Church handled the abuse cases. Mahony
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stated:

"if I had known in 1986 or 1987 what I know in

2002, obviously we would done things differently. The

Church relied very heavily on the recommendations of

psychologists and others. Their recommendations to us now
are far different."
On April 24, Watanabe and Shuster (2002) reported that

Mahony had met with other American cardinals and Vatican

officials in Italy in order to institute steps making it
easier to defrock priests guilty of sexual abuse. In the

meeting, Mahony called for the Zero Tolerance policy—which

included the notion of ousting even those priests who had

committed abuse decades ago and had stayed clean since.
Mahony said in the meeting that,

if the primary concern was

protecting children and youth from abusive priests,

then

Zero Tolerance was the only solution. Unfortunately,

the

priests in the meeting remained less certain that Mahony's
call for Zero Tolerance was the best solution to the

crisis. Their refusal to approve the Zero Tolerance policy
as promoted by Mahony disappointed many critics among

American Catholics.
On May 16, Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve

Cooley, had threatened Mahony with a grand jury

investigation unless the archdiocese surrendered all
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documents related to the alleged sexual abuse of children.

Cooley said it was no longer acceptable to provide only
verbal information to law enforcement agencies. Without
access to the archdiocese's full written documentation on

allegations, Cooley said, Los Angeles police and sheriff's

deputies were hampered in their investigations

(Winton &

Watanabe, 2 0 02) .

One day after being threatened with a grand jury

investigation, Winton and Shuster (2002) reported, Mahony
pledged to make the archdiocese's files on priestly abuse

available to the district attorney,

the Los Angeles Police

Department, and the county Sheriff's Department.

In’a media

interview that day, Mahony said that he would turn over

documents that could include letters, notes of meetings,
names and addresses of alleged priests, and other
correspondence. He said they also would be made available

to local law enforcement agencies if they require them.

"We

want every single thing out, open and dealt with," Mahony

said.

"The last thing I want is this going on for months

and months." Additionally, Mahony said that he would work

with the district attorney's office to ask priests accused
of abusing minors for authorization to release their

confidential medical and psychological records.
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On May 29, Hall

(2002) reported that the archdiocese

hired Sitrick & Co., a prominent and expensive public

relations firm specializing in high-profile clients with
big troubles. Before contracting with Sitrick,

the

archdiocese had been advised by public relations firm Weber

Shandwick. According to Michael Hennigan, the archdiocese's

attorney,

the archdiocese hired Sitrick because the

archdiocese was not doing well in the press.

Winton and Shuster (2002) reported that, Sitrick
personnel advised Mahony to be featured in full-page ads on
June 6 in three Los Angeles newspapers: Los Angeles Times,

Daily News Los Angeles, and La Opinion,

to reassure the

public that Mahony was taking significant steps to prevent

future abuse by priests in the archdiocese. Written as an
open letter to residents of Los Angeles and surrounding

communities, Mahony repeated many proposals he had
previously announced in news conferences and interviews. He

stressed how he made no exceptions to his Zero Tolerance
policy. He also called for fingerprinting and criminal
background checks for all priesthood candidates in the

archdiocese. Mahony wrote that any new allegations of

sexual abuse would be referred immediately to the police
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and the accused priest would be removed from active
ministry until the case was resolved.

Public Opinion on the Church's
Crisis Communication
When CBS News conducted a telephone poll to 892 adults
nationwide from June 18 to June 20, 2002,
showed that most

(74%)

survey results

said United States leaders of the

Catholic Church had done a poor job handling the recent
charges of sexual abuse of children and teenagers by

priests

(CBS News Poll, 2002).

Another telephone poll was conducted by ABC News
(2002)

to 1,023 adults nationwide from June 19 to June 23,

2002. These survey results showed that almost half of the
respondents

(46%)

strongly disapproved and 21% somewhat

disapproved of the way the Catholic Church had handled the

issue of sexual abuse of children by priests.
USA Today's Cathy Lynn Grossman (2002) reported a
telephone survey of 1,507 American Catholics on the

Church's response to the scandal. The poll was conducted by
Le Moyne College, a Jesuit college in Syracuse, New York,

with Zogby International Polling Firm from March 12-16,

2002.
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The survey results showed that more" than half

(51%) of

the respondents said that the Church had done a poor job
handling the child sexual abuse issue. According to William

Barnett, professor of religious studies at Le Moyne
College,

the scandal had damaged the credibility of

American bishops. The approval rating of their leadership

had plummeted from 85% in October 2001 to 68% in March
2002.
On October 20,

Stammer (2002) reported a poll

conducted by the Los Angeles Times. The poll results were
based on 1,854 responses from Catholic priests nationwide

to a survey conducted by mail from June 27 to October 11,

2002. Two-thirds of the nation's Roman Catholic priests
disapproved of the way that U.S. bishops have handled

sexual abuse allegations against members of clergy. The
findings of the poll,

the most extensive nationwide opinion

survey of American priests since 1994, pointed out a

pervasive and deep-seated anger among many priests. Many
were upset at the nation's bishops. In written comments
that many priests submitted with the poll responses,

they

said bishops delayed dealing with the crisis in the first

place in January 2002. More than three out of five of those

surveyed said they believed that most or many of the
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allegations of sexual abuse of minors by priests were true.

More than half

(53%)

said they thought the Church was too

lenient in disciplining those accused of misconduct.

The survey results from all of these polls showed that
the public nationwide, both Catholics and non-Catholics,
disapproved of the way the .Church handled the scandal and

held the bishops responsible for the mishandling.
What was true nationwide was also true for the Los
Angeles Archdiocese. On June 26, Watanabe

(2002) reported,

Mahony was named by Beliefnet.com, a leading religious
website, as one of the nation's nine worst bishops in

handling clergy sexual abuse. Beliefnet.com stated that,
despite Mahony's recent efforts to take a tough stand on

reform, he had failed to dismiss promptly at least three
priests who reportedly admitted to sexual abuse of minors.

The web site also stated that plaintiffs had charged Mahony
with "concealing information" from law enforcement

officials on abuse allegations. Its writers criticized the
archdiocese's approach to victims as "potential litigants

rather than wounded souls."

The respected site, which reaches nearly five million

people a month,

features news and commentary on a broad

range of religious traditions, based its conclusions on
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Mahony largely on its editors'

interpretation of news media

reports rather than on independent research.

Relevant Principles of Effective
Crisis Communication.

The Los Angeles Archdiocese's crisis communication in the
child sexual abuse scandal can be evaluated by five

principles of effective crisis communication. The
principles are as follows:
1. Timeliness
2. Openness

3. Honesty

.

4. Regret

5. Accessibility'

The first principle of effective crisis communication
requires the organization to respond to the situation in a
timely manner. According to Williams and Treadaway (1992),

an organization in a crisis must be able to give a quick,
definitive statement on the situation that specifies where
the public and media attention should be focused, and what

actions the organization will take. Berge (1990) and Wilson
(1985) noted that with a quick response and with efforts to
keep the organization's spokesperson visible to the media,
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the organization gains its opportunity to tell its own side
of the story. An organization that fails to provide such a

response does not fulfill the goal of this timeliness

principle.

The second principle of effective crisis communication is
openness. During a crisis, an organization must be open to

the media and its public by providing ongoing information
(Pinsdorf,

1987; Gray,

1986; Anderson,

1979). All any

reporter wants is some kind of response

Kempner,

(Pinsdorf,

19 87;

1995). The reporter is doing his or her job and

has to explain to the assignment editor why there is no

quote or there is a blank tape with someone being silent or

saying "no comment"

respond,
all

(Kempner,

even with ambiguity,

(Gottschalk,

1995; Henry,

2000) . To

is better than no response at

1993; Dougherty,

1992).

The third principle of effective crisis communication
necessitates that the organization be honest in its

response. The organization's spokesperson does not have to
tell the media everything he or she knows, but what he or

she does say should be accurate (Kim & Charles,

1988;

Dunkle 1990) . This applies not only to the literal accuracy
of the facts, but also to the overall impression that the

spokesperson presents

(Nylen & Hultaker,
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1987; Morris,

1991; Caponigro 2000). The organization's spokesperson
should not try to mislead the media and the public
(Kempner,

1995). He or she should tell them what he or she

can and should not talk about what he or she can't

(Kempner,

1995; Gottschalk, 1993; Caponigro,

2000).

The fourth principle of effective crisis communication
is regret. The organization needs to apologize when

appropriate and to show compassion to the victims

1991; Fearn-Banks,

(Ray,

2002). The.media and the public respect

an early apology given rather than one that comes after a

considerable period of stonewalling (Ray,

1991; Kempner,

1995; Dunkle 1990). They want the organization's
spokesperson to say that he or she is sorry it happened
(Ray,

1990.; Nylen & Hultaker,

organization is guilty,

1987). Not that the

or even responsible,

regrets the event (Dunkle,

1990). Then,

just that it

they want the

organization to assure them that it will not happen again
(Kempner,

1995; Dougherty,

1992).

Throughout the length of the crisis,

the organization

must demonstrate its full and genuine concern (Gray,

1986).

To show the media and the public that the organization is
truly upset by the event and it will do everything possible
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to ease the pain of the victims

Kempner,

1995; Gray,

(Wilson,

1985; Ray,

1991;

1986).

The fifth and last principle of effective crisis

communication necessitates that the organization be
accessible. A spokesperson should always take or return

reporters' calls and try to be sensitive to the media's
deadline problems

(Nudell & Antokol, 1988; Fink,

1986) .

According to Caponigro (2000) accessibility is largely a
matter of courtesy, but it also helps to eliminate any

impression that the organization has some reason to avoid
the press. The organization wants to at least appear to
know what it is doing (Lerbinger,

1986). Returning a call

just to say "I don't know" or "I can't talk about that" is

much better than ignoring the call altogether (Wilson,
1985) .
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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the methodology employed in

this study examining crisis communication strategy employed
by the Los Angeles Archdiocese in communicating with the

media during the child sexual abuse scandal. There are
three methodology issues: 1)

the time frame studied,

2)

selection of sources of information about the archdiocese's

crisis communication strategies, and 3) the Critical model
used to analyze those strategies.

The Time Frame

The study examines public communication from the

archdiocese through the media from late January 2002 to
early June 2002. The rationale for these parameters is
straightforward.

The author considered this six-month time frame as the
most reasonable because, during this period,

the

archdiocese was on its own in handling the crisis and in
dealing with chorus of questions and criticisms with no

specific guidance from other dioceses in the country or the

Vatican. That guidance came in with the meeting of the
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United States Conference of Catholic Bishops on June 14,
in Dallas, Texas. The guidance was in a form of two

2002,

major documents: a "Charter for the Protection of Children

and Young People" and a set of "Essential Norms for

Diocesan/Eparchial Policies Dealing with Allegations of

Sexual Abuse of Minors by Priests, Deacons,
Personnel"

or Other Church

(United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,

2002) .

Public Information Regarding
the Scandal

Information describing the archdiocese's response to
allegations of sexual misconduct came principally from two

sources: the Los Angeles Times—who reported the most about
the scandal, and the archdiocese's leaked internal e-mails.
As the nation's largest metropolitan daily newspaper

and one of the nation's oldest newspapers, the Los Angeles

Times dominates its media market (Los Angeles Times, 2 0 03) .
It publishes five daily regional editions covering the Los

Angeles metropolitan area, Orange and Ventura counties,

the

San Fernando Valley, and an Inland Empire edition covering

Riverside and San Bernardino counties
2002). In 2002,

(Los Angeles Times,

the circulation was 1,006,130 daily and
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1,367,932 on Sundays—the highest circulation ranking for a

daily newspaper in the Los Angeles County (Los Angeles

Almanac, 2002).
The archdiocese's leaked internal e-mails, which
described the archdiocese's effort to contain sexual

allegations, were broadcast by Los Angeles KFI Radio and

were posted on the radio's website.

The Model of Effective
Crisis Communication

The model of effective crisis communication is based

on the review of the literature.- In Chapter Two,

the author

reviewed eleven books and seven journals written by leading
public relations scholars and practitioners. The goal of

this review was to sift out the principles of crisis
management about which experts agree. The result was a
five-factor model of crisis communication effectiveness. To

be explained in detail in Chapter Four, this five-factor
model includes: 1)

timeliness, 2) openness, 3) honesty,

4)

regret, and 5) accessibility.
The five-factor model of effective crisis
communication is the author's original contribution to

research in the field of crisis communication. The author
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comes to this five-factor model because it is applicable
and it is the most efficient to examine the archdiocese's

child sexual abuse crisis. The five principles of effective
crisis communication have currency to the literature

credible model and are reflective across the board.
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CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

This chapter describes how the strategies employed by

the Los Angeles Archdiocese in communicating with the media
during its crisis of child sexual abuse violated the five
principles of effective crisis communication:

1)

timeliness, 2) openness, 3) honesty,

4)

regret , and

5) accessibility.

Timeliness

The first principle of effective crisis communication

requires the organization in a crisis to provide the media
and the public with an immediate response about the
situation, and to signify what actions it will take.

The Los Angeles Archdiocese violated the principle of

timeliness by waiting too long to respond to its largest

public to the scandal. This ongoing lack of timely response
was actually employed throughout the six-month time frame.

Instead of making a strong, definitive statement
immediately following the sex abuse lawsuit that was filed
against Mahony in late January 2002,

the archdiocese waited

a month to respond through Mahony's pastoral statement. The
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pastoral statement, however, only stated the archdiocese's

compliance with its Zero Tolerance policy and the
California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. There was
no response to the lawsuit, which had served to put the

archdiocese in a less-defensible position. Eventually,
throughout the six months period,

the archdiocese refused

to publicly discuss the case and its settlement.
The archdiocese's position was further compromised
when it delayed responding to the media's second

bombardment on March 4 about the archdiocese's cover-up
effort of the dismissals. The archdiocese's spokesperson
did respond immediately that day, but he did not mention
the dismissals. He only said that Mahony was committed to

obeying the California Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting

Act and protecting the children of the archdiocese. Mahony

did not publicly confirmed the dismissals until 18 days
later, on March 22, and continued to decline to release the

names and number of the dismissed priests. He also failed
to explain the archdiocese's reasons without explaining the
reasons for not revealing the information. He did not

publicly explain these reasons until ten days later,

April 2.
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on

The delayed-response strategy continued following the

Fresno woman's accusation on March 22. When the Fresno
woman accused Mahony of molesting her as a high school
student in the 1970s, Mahony did immediately report the

accusation to Los Angeles Police Department and did deny
the allegation, but made no response to. the media and the

public on that day. Mahony did not publicly discuss the
case until 26 days later, on April 18.

The archdiocese's credibility was further damaged when
it failed to provide an immediate response to its leaked

internal e-mails that were aired by Los Angeles KFI Radio

on April 4 and April 5. Instead of dealing with the content
of the e-mails,

the archdiocese tried to cover it up by

obtaining a cease-and-desist order from the Superior Court
to prevent the e-mails being broadcast by the radio

station. As mentioned in Chapter Two,

the leaked e-mails

revealed that Mahony had fired eight accused priests,

and

that the archdiocese officials had made conscious effort to
contain some of the sexual abuse allegations. When Mahony

publicly responded a week later,

on April 12, he said that

he regretted his decision to transfer Father Michael Wempe,
one of the accused priests mentioned in the leaked e-mails,
to Cedars-Sinai Medical Center. He also clarified the
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number of known sex abuse cases but, again, he neglected to
mention the leaked e-mails.

The archdiocese's lack of timely responses showed the
archdiocese's lack of responsibility in the crisis to media

personnel, members of the Los Angeles Archdiocese, members
of other Catholic dioceses worldwide, regional law

enforcement and court officials, and businesses and non
governmental organizations allied with the Los Angeles

Archdiocese.

The delayed-response strategy damaged the
archdiocese's image.and angered the public, as evidenced by
protesters confronting Mahony on March 24, who said that,

with total 50 sexual abuse cases in the last five years

alone, Mahony had, even before the current crisis,

ignored

the sex abuse problem for far too long and had not for some

years been nearly forthcoming enough.

Openness
The second principle of effective crisis communication

requires that the organization in a crisis be open to the

media and the public about the situation and that it

provides ongoing information throughout the crisis period.
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The archdiocese violated the principle of openness. In
late January 2002, Mahony refused to answer questions from

the media about the sex abuse lawsuit recently filed
against him. Mahony and other archdiocese officials
preferred silence and never publicly discussed the case.
This closed strategy continued following the

dismissals of charged priests on March 4. When asked by the
media about the names and number of priests dismissed,

the

archdiocese officials declined to reveal any information
and did not provide any justifications for their refusal.
They were also unwilling to comment on whether the

archdiocese had reported the abuse cases of these
particular priests to the local police.

The archdiocese repeated the same mistake after March
22 by not responding to the media about the Fresno woman's

accusation against Mahony himself. The archdiocese made no
public announcement about the accusation on that day, and
its officials refused to answer questions about it. This

was the second time Mahony had chosen to ignore requests to

respond about the sex abuse allegations against him.

The archdiocese's credibility is heavily dependent on
its responsibility to respond to questions and concerns of
the public and the press as openly as possible.
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Its

strategy of silence and withholding information not only
damaged its image with the press, but also further angered

the public. John Lynch, a lifelong faithful who went to
Catholic school all the way through college,
Angeles Times Columnist Steve Lopez

(2002)

told the Los

on March 15 that

he was tired of the archdiocese's silence and denials.
Lynch said:
Enough with the tap dance. Catholics are fed up with
cover-ups, and we're not going to take it anymore.

They throw a few lower clergy to the'wolves, and
that's it? You've got to figure it goes up higher than

that, and this culture of silence,

whispers and rumors,

this atmosphere of

it's just no good anymore.

Honesty

The third principle of effective crisis communication
necessitates that the organization be honest in its
response to the situation, by providing accurate and

straightforward information. The archdiocese violated the
principle of honesty by providing the media with inaccurate

information about its accused priests.

The archdiocese was not being honest in its response

on March 4 when asked by the media if the archdiocese had
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given the names of the dismissed priests,to the local

police. The archdiocese's spokesperson responded that

Mahony had complied with the legally mandated reporting law
that obligated each person working for the archdiocese to

report any suspicion of child abuse to the local police.
His statement implied that the archdiocese had given the
names and all information necessary of the dismissed

priests to the local police. When contacted by the Los
Angeles Times on that same day, the local police said that
they had not received any calls from the archdiocese

officials regarding those allegations.
The archdiocese repeated the same misleading strategy
in its response on March 22. That day, Mahony confirmed in

The Tidings that the dismissals had occurred,

stating that

he had dismissed six to 12 of the archdiocese's priests

accused of past sexual abuse. He refused to reveal the
exact number. He said that all of the priests' names had
been duly reported to the authorities, and they had been

prosecuted and had served their probation many years ago.
In one of the archdiocese's leaked internal e-mails,

however, Mahony wrote to his officials and attorneys that

out of the total of eight accused priests he had dismissed,
the archdiocese had reported only five to the local police,
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and had failed to report the other three. The e-mails not
only proved that the archdiocese's public relations effort

was misleading the public with inaccurate information,

they

suggested that this was a conscious strategy.

This strategy continued in a media interview on April

2 when Mahony said that none of the recently dismissed
priests were currently involved in any ministry involving
children or youths. Mahony further stated in the interview

that most of the dismissed priests were already retired-some of them were living outside the archdiocese and

remained canonically attached as priests to the
archdiocese.
This statement appears to violate Mahony's pledge in

his pastoral statement on February 21 that "the archdiocese
will not knowingly assign or retain a priest, deacon,
religious or layperson to serve in its parishes, schools,

pastoral ministries, or any other assignment when such an

individual is determined to have previously engaged in
sexual abuse of a minor."
In addition, a dialogue in one of the leaked internal

e-mails between two archdiocese officials, Sister Judy

Murphy and Monsignor Craig Cox, proved that the archdiocese
had lied in its response about removing all accused priests
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from the ministry.

In the e-mail,

Sister Murphy wrote

Monsignor Cox that, there was an accused priest whose name
was in Mahony's "recently removed" list, but actually was

never removed from the ministry (Archdiocese of Los

Angeles, 2002).
The archdiocese's credibility also depended on its

abilities to respond to the situation with honest attempts.
The archdiocese's strategy of misleading the public by

providing inaccurate information to the media accomplished
the opposite. The strategy further jeopardized its

position, as it made the archdiocese appear insincere in
its desire to protect children and youths from sex abuse as
its top priority. Lopez

(2002) commented in his column in

the Los Angeles Times published on April 5:
It would have been nice to find out how many priests

Mahony dismissed recently,

so the media does not have

to keep referring to a number between six and 12. By

not telling us the real number, we're left with no
choice but to wonder if maybe it's even more than
between six and 12. Maybe it was between six and 14,

or maybe the cardinal doesn't even know himself, and

is embarrassed to admit it. If you're not going to
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answer basic questions, all you can accomplish is to

keep getting those very questions tossed back at you.

Regret

The fourth principle of effective crisis communication
suggests that the organization in a crisis apologize and

show compassion to the victims early in the crisis period.

This strategy is fundamental, because the media and the

public respect an early apology rather than one that comes
after a considerable period of stonewalling. The
archdiocese violated this principle by waiting too long to

apologize and to show its compassion to the victims.
Approximately two months after the scandal first
erupted, Mahony told about 300 Catholic priests at a mass

at Our Lady of Refuge Church in Long Beach that, as the

head of the archdiocese, he apologized and accepted
responsibility for the "sins in the past" by priests. He

promised that the archdiocese would cooperate with the law

enforcement on sexual abuse cases. However, he added that
he would not release to the public the names of the alleged
pedophile priests.

His omissions led stakeholders to

assume he was hiding and protecting them, as well as the
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image of the Church,

instead of the safety of its youngest

members.

About a month after the mass, Mahony apologized for a
second time in a media interview. He said that he and other

archdiocese officials were "deeply sorry for those who had
been victimized by the priests" and announced that,

"the

archdiocese would take forward-looking actions" to guard
against sex abuse in the archdiocese. He also expressed

regret for his and the archdiocese's mishandling of the
scandal.

Archdiocesan officials' delay in apologizing about the

scandal and in showing compassion to the victims weakened

their credibility even further, as news of the scandals

grew wilder and uglier. Week by week new allegations of

abuse against children leaked out, causing the press
continue to print negative stories about the Church's

handling of the crisis.

Accessibility

The final principle of effective crisis communication
requires the organization in a crisis to be accessible to
the media and the public. The principle obliges the

organization to always return reporters' calls,
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to

eliminate the impression that the organization has some
reason to avoid the press. This principle holds that the

organization should persuade the media to depend on the
organization's spokesperson for information. If the

organization fails to provide reliable access, media

reporters will seek for information from other sources, who
can cause their news stories to be misleading. By not

returning media's calls,

the archdiocese violated this

principle.
This occurred on March 4, when personnel the

archdiocese failed to call media reporters back with
information about the dismissed priests. As a result of
that, the media looked for the information from other
sources who were familiar with the dismissals.
On March 13, Lopez

(2002)

reported that the

archdiocese officials again did not return his calls when
he asked them whether they called the police regarding the

accused priests. When he did not hear from anyone at the
archdiocese, Lopez

(2002)

said he went to talk to

prosecutors George Palmer and Irene Wakabayashi in the Los

Angeles County district attorney's office for information.
From his conversation with the two prosecutors, Lopez

(2002) concluded that priests could get away from reporting
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sex abuse to the law enforcement authorities because of the

Church's own legal system. Lopez

(2002) said:

There are so many loopholes in child abuse cases. It

wouldn't be hard for the Catholic Church or another

institution to hide behind a technicality and legally
avoid calling the police in most cases.

sex abuse is made during confession,

If a claim of

for instance, the

priest can keep it quiet because of clergy privilege.
If the alleged crime occurred before 1987 but was

reported afterward,

the church doesn't have to call

the police because clergy,

for reasons only the devil

knows, essentially got a waiver prior to 1987.
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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This study has examined crisis communication in the
case of child sexual abuse scandal involving the Roman
Catholic Los Angeles Archdiocese. In this chapter,

the

author draws conclusions regarding the archdiocese's

handling of the crisis and make recommendations about
effective crisis communication principles for public

relations practitioners and for academic community.

Conclusions

This study has shown that the archdiocese clearly

failed to satisfy the five principles of effective crisis
communication. The combination of slow,

indecisive

responses and other unsuccessful strategies damaged the
archdiocese's image with the media and the public during
this period.

Instead of responding to the initial statements of the
media and the public,

the archdiocese actually needed to be

proactive after the sex abuse lawsuit was filed against

Mahony in the last weekend of January 2002. To minimize
damage to its image, within 24 hours after the lawsuit,
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the

archdiocese should have provided the media and the public
with straightforward information about the situation,

the

steps the archdiocese planned to take to handle the crisis,
and an apology for what had happened to the victims.

The archdiocese's lack of a strong initial response

allowed the media and others to alert the world about its

scandal. Its hesitancy also immediately placed the

archdiocese in the position of responding to changes

without much of a defense. The archdiocese's reactive
stance worsened when someone leaked the archdiocese's
internal e-mails containing comments on the dismissed
priests that proved its earlier statements had been

inaccurate. This inactivity added the possibility of
dishonesty to the archdiocese's initial communication

problems.

Recommendations

This study has shown that silence will not make an
issue to go away. It will worsen the situation and will
damage an organization's credibility. As an example of
crisis communication, what can readers learn from the
archdiocese's handling of this crisis? Here are some

recommendations for public relations practitioners:
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1. Respond to a crisis within 24 hours. To be able to

respond to the crisis immediately, an organization must
have a prior crisis communication plan. This provides an
advantage to the communicator in determining which issues
to address and in predicting how they will be viewed by the

large public. Not responding to the crisis immediately was

a fatal mistake that damaged the archdiocese's credibility.
2. Tell the truth and be open. Always provide the

media with facts about the situation and be consistent with
your response. Giving the media misleading information with
omitted facts damaged the archdiocese's credibility.

3. Always return reporters' calls. Let them to depend
on you for stories. The archdiocese ignored reporters'

deadlines and failed to return their calls. This gave the
impression that the archdiocese was trying to contain

information, which caused reporters seek stories from other
sources.
This study has proven that the five-factor model of

effective crisis communication presented can be applied

successfully in analyzing the archdiocese's communication
strategies in the sex abuse crisis. The model is the

author's new contribution to the literature on case
analyses of crisis communication. Therefore,
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for future

research in crisis communication, this study suggests
o ’1
public relations academicians to use this model in

analyzing organizational communication crises.
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